Abstract: Contemporary steganography approaches suffer from many serious deficiencies; generally, they attempt to hide data as detectable and suspicious noise in a cover that is assumed to look innocent. In addition, steganography approaches found in literature have focused on how to conceal a message and not on how to camouflage its transmittal. This paper presents a comprehensive survey that focuses mainly on, but not limited to, computational linguistics aspects of steganography and it is organised as follows: Section 1 concisely details the fundamental concepts related to steganography, summarises the current state of the research, and highlights the technical concerns. Then, it briefly describes the modern steganography, namely noiseless steganography (Nostega). Section 2 discusses the contemporary steganography and Nostega paradigm (the modern steganography). Section 3 demonstrates Nostega-based methodologies. Section 4 presents a brief overview of steganalysis. Section 5 concludes the survey and highlights directions for future research.
Introduction
The outline of this section is as follows. Section 1.1 briefly covers some of the fundamental concepts related to steganography, summarises the current state of the research, and highlights the technical concerns. Section 1.2 summarises the contribution. Finally, Section 1.3 details the organisation of this survey.
Steganography: definition, current state and concerns
Steganography is the scientific art of concealing the presence of covert communications. The origin of steganography is traced back to ancient civilisations (Kipper, 2004; Davern and Scott, 2006) . The ancient Egyptians communicated covertly using the hieroglyphic language, a series of symbols representing a message. The message looks as if it is a drawing of a picture although it may contain a hidden message. Hieroglyphic contained hidden information that only a legitimate person who knew what to look for could detect. After the Egyptians, the Greeks used steganography, 'hidden writing', where the name was derived (Kipper, 2004; Johnson and Katzenbeisser, 1999) .
In general, steganography approaches hide a message in a cover e.g., text, image, audio file, etc., in such a way that is assumed to look innocent and therefore would not raise suspicion. Fundamentally, the steganographic goal is not to hinder the adversary from decoding a hidden message, but to prevent an adversary from suspecting the existence of covert communications (Johnson and Katzenbeisser, 1999) . Thus, when using any steganographic technique if suspicion is raised, the goal of steganography is defeated regardless of whether or not a plaintext is revealed (Kessler, 2004; Martin et al., 2005) . Contemporary schemes are generally categorised based on the steganographic cover type into text, image, audio, etc.
Textual steganography can be classified as textual format manipulation (TFM) and textual fabrication (TF) (Johnson and Katzenbeisser, 1999) . In TFM, comparing the original text with the modified text will reveal the hidden message (Kessler, 2004; Bennett, 2004) . On the other hand, TF techniques hide a message either by generating an entire text-cover, such as null cipher (Kahn, 1996) and mimic functions (Wayner,1992 (Wayner, , 2000 , or manipulating an existing text such as NICETEXT and SCRAMBLE (Chapman and Davida, 1997; Chapman, M et al., 2001; Davida, 2002, 2007) , and translation-based (Grothoff et al., 2005 (Grothoff et al., , 2005b Stutsman et al., 2006) . However, the text-cover that is generated by these approaches often has numerous linguistic flaws that can easily raise suspicion. Such flaws in text steganography are referred to thereafter as noise. It is argued that such a noise makes it feasible to even reveal the hidden message (Johnson and Katzenbeisser, 1999; Bennett, 2004; Grothoff et al., 2005b) .
On the other hand, image steganography is based on manipulating digital images to conceal a message. Such manipulation often renders the message as noise. In general, image steganography suffers from several issues such as the potential of distortion, the significant size limitation of the messages that can be embedded, and the increased vulnerability of detection through contemporary image processing techniques (Martin et al., 2005) . Audio-covers have also been pursued. Example of audio steganography techniques include LSB Seppanen, 2004, 2004b) , spread spectrum coding Kirovski and Malvar, 2005) , phase coding Ansari et al., 2004) , and echo hiding (Gruhl et al., 1996) . In general, these techniques are too complex, and like their image-based counterpart, are still subject to distortion and detection (Martin et al., 2005) .
The inability of contemporary steganography approaches to achieve the steganographic goal is traced back to the fact that they impose hiding process that creates detectable noise in the stega-cover. The shortcomings of these schemes motivate the development of Nostega paradigm [Desoky, 2008a [Desoky, , 2009a ], as shown in Sections 1.2 and 2.1.6.
Modern steganography (Nostega)
The major contribution of modern steganography is the novel noiseless steganography (Nostega) paradigm [Desoky, 2008a [Desoky, , 2009a ]. Nostega neither conceals data in noise nor generates noise. Instead, it opts to make the presence of the hidden data natural in the cover so that neither linguistic flaws nor fingerprint are introduced as a side effect. In addition, Nostega legitimatises the interaction among the communicating parties so that an adversary would not suspect the association between a sender and a receiver. Based on the novel Nostega [Desoky, 2008a [Desoky, , 2009a , in process (a)] paradigm, numerous methodologies are developed. The basic concepts of these methodologies are highlighted as follows.
• Graph steganography (Graphstega) methodology: Graphstega methodology is the science and art of avoiding the arousal of suspicion in covert communications by concealing a message in a novel cover type namely graph-cover (Desoky and Younis, 2008) .
• Chess steganography (Chestega) methodology: Chestega exploits popular games such as chess, checkers, crosswords, domino, etc., to embed data in steganographic game-cover (Desoky and Younis, 2009 ).
• Education-centric steganography (Edustega) methodology: Edustega camouflages data in educational documents by manipulating, mainly but not limited to, questions and answers (e.g., multiple-choice, true-or-false, fill-in-the-space, matching, etc.) of exams, examples, puzzles, competitions, etc., in order to embed data without generating any suspicious pattern [Desoky, 2009a, in process (a) , in process (b)].
• Summarisation-based steganography (Sumstega) methodology: Sumstega takes advantage of recent advances in automatic summarisation techniques to generate a text-cover . It pursues the variations among the outputs of auto-summarisation techniques to conceal data.
• List-based steganography (Listega) methodology: Exploits itemised data to conceal messages in a form of textual list (Desoky, 2009b ).
• Notes-based steganography (Notestega) methodology: Takes advantage of the recent advances in automatic notetaking techniques to generate a text-cover. Notestega embeds data in the natural variations among both human-notes and the outputs of automatic-notetaking techniques (Desoky, 2009c ).
• Mature linguistic steganography (Matlist) methodology: Employs natural language generation (NLG) and template techniques along with random series (RS) values, e.g., binary, decimal, hexadecimal, octal, alphabetic, alphanumeric, etc., of domain-specific subject (DSS), e.g., financial, medical, mathematical, scientific, economical, etc., to generate noiseless text-cover [Desoky, 2009a [Desoky, , in process (a), 2008b .
Unlike all other approaches, the normal linguistic steganography (NORMALS) methodology neither generates noise nor uses noisy text to camouflage data. NORMALS employs NLG techniques to generate noiseless (flawless) and legitimate text-cover by manipulating the inputs' parameters of NLG system in order to camouflage data in the generated text . As a result, NORMALS is capable of fooling both human and machine examinations. Unlike Matlist, NORMALS is capable of handling non-RS domains. The implementation, validation, and experimental results demonstrate that these methodologies are capable of achieving the steganographical goal.
The reminder of this survey is as follows. Section 2 describes the contemporary and the modern steganography approaches. Sections 3 Section describes the steganalysis. Section 4 concludes the survey and highlights directions for future research.
Contemporary steganography
This section discusses the contemporary steganography approaches found in the literature and highlights their shortcomings. The published schemes are categorised based on the steganographic cover type into textual and non-textual schemes; each is discussed in a distinct subsection. Then, it demonstrates the modern steganography, namely Nostega paradigm.
Text steganography
Textual steganography approaches conceal data in a text-cover. Since the twentieth century, the development of textual steganography has been minimal. Nonetheless, these approaches can be categorised as follows.
Textual format manipulation
This is a non-linguistic steganography technique that hides data by exploiting the format of text (Petitcolas, 1999) . TFM modifies an original text by employing spaces, misspellings, fonts, font size, font style, colours, and non-colour (as invisible ink) to embed an encoded message. However, comparing the original text to the modified text triggers suspicion and enables an adversary to detect where a message is hidden. In addition, TFM can be distorted and may be discerned by human eyes or detected by a computer (Bennett, 2004; Petitcolas, 1999; Shirali-Shahreza and Shirali-Shahreza, 2006) .
Series of characters and words
During World War I, the Germans communicated covertly using a series of characters and words known as null-cipher (Kahn, 1996) . A null-cipher is a predetermined protocol of character and word sequence that is read according to a set of rules such as: read every seventh word or read every ninth character in a message. Apparently, suspicion is raised because the user is forced to fabricate a text-cover according to a predetermined protocol, which may introduce some peculiarity in the text that draws suspicion and defeats the steganographical goal. In addition, applying a brute force attack may reveal the entire message. The following is a famous example of null cipher: PRESIDENT At the time of World War I, the above telegram message was sent to Berlin by the German Embassy in Washington, DC. A series of characters and words (null cipher) was used and the predetermined protocol was to read a character from each word based on the message number. The first message was to read a first character of each word. On the other hand, the second message was to read a second character of each word. Following the protocol reveals the message below: "PERSHING SAILS FROM N.Y. JUNE 1." (Wayner, 2002) 
Statistical-based
Wayner (1992, 2002) has introduced the mimic functions approach. The word mimic means 'imitate' and that is what the mimic functions does, imitating some of the statistical properties of legitimate text. The final product of mimic functions should fit the statistical profile of the chosen legitimate text. Literately, it employs the inverse of the Huffman Code by inputting a data stream of randomly distributed bits to produce text that obeys the statistical profile of a particular normal text. Therefore, the generated text by mimic functions is resilient against statistical attacks. Mimic functions can employ the concept of both context free grammars (CFG) and Van Wijnaarden grammars to enhance the output. The output of regular mimic functions is gibberish rendering it extremely suspicious (Bennett, 2004; Wayner 1992 Wayner , 2002 Petitcolas, 1999) . However, the combination of mimic functions and CFG slightly improved the readability of the text (Wayner 1992 (Wayner , 2002 . Even though, the delectability issues persist. Furthermore, if an adversary were to guess the generation of the 'seed text' he may be able to reveal the original plaintext (Bennett, 2004) .
The following example is generated by Spammic (1999) , which is an online tool that employs mimic functions. The text is the cover that hides the short message, 'Author: Abdelrahman Desoky'. Clearly the tool renders a long text and linguistically retains very bad quality, as shown below:
It's time for another game between the Whappers and the Blogs in scenic downtown Blovonia. I've just got to say that the Blog fans have come to support their team and rant and rave. Play Ball! Top of the inning. No outs. Now, Sal Sauvignon comes to the plate. Here we go. Here's the pitch It's a screamer. No good. Ball. He's winding up. What a fast one that looked like it was rising. He knocks a line-drive into the head of Robby Rawhide No trouble yet. The pitcher spits. Prince Albert von Carmicheal adjusts the cup and enters the batter's box. Okay. The next pitch is a fastball with wings. High and outside.
Synonym-based
Chapman and Davida have introduced a steganographic scheme consisting of two functions called NICETEXT and SCRAMBLE that uses a large dictionary (Chapman and Davida, 1997 , 2002 Chapman et al., 2001) . NICETEXT uses a piece of text to manipulate the process of embedding a message in a form of synonym substitutions. This process preserves the meaning of text-cover (the original piece of text) every time it is used. The synonyms-based approach attracted the attention of numerous researchers in the last decade: Winstein (2008a Winstein ( , 2008b , Bolshakov (2004) , Bolshakov and Gelbukh (2004) , Calvo and Bolshakov (2004) , Chand and Orgun (2006) , Nakagawa et al. (2001) , Niimi et al. (2003) , Bergmair and Katzenbeisser (2007, 2004) , Bergmair (2004) , Topkara et al. (2006) , Murphy and Vogel (2007) and Atallah et al. (2001 Atallah et al. ( , 2002 . Although the text-cover of synonym-based approach may look legitimate from a linguistics point of view given the adequate accuracy of the chosen synonyms, reusing the same piece of text to hide a message is a steganographical concern. If an adversary intercepts the communications and oversees the same piece of text that has the same meaning over and over again with just different group of synonyms between communicating parties, he will question such use. The following is an example of the generated text by NICETEXT (Chapman, 1997): Advance around the Third Half during 1997 Either, the generally operative down ago relationships has financial. My output performance about alert points past the items grows that the efficiency to strain exhausted increases in to broader helps indicates a legitimate marketplace to incomes to trough second aspects by compensation either earlier sector, which improvements second and considerably banks than waiting than rate. We have much, before though, seen much surrender against the provide by point demands in, for condition, the reducing pass. Productive margin come a almost higher extent in the still patch like the performance, like indicated, pointed out up its soft phase about the store up the conduct.
It is observed that the text generated by NICETEXT, as shown by the above example, does not make sense and semantically incoherent. This approach has been later enhanced in Davida, 1997, 2002; Chapman et al., 2001; to tackle these shortcomings. The following is an example using the enhanced version (Chapman et al., 2001 ):
It took me a long time to complete the project.
It took me a long duration to complete the project.
It took me a long period to complete the project.
It took me a long span to complete the project.
The above examples reveal that the robustness of the synonym-based approach remains questionable regardless whether the enhanced version is capable of generating a better text. Linguistically, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, that one may find large number of synonyms that can be generally used in various contexts.
Noise-Based
Grothoff et al. have introduced the translation-based steganographic scheme (Grothoff, 2005a (Grothoff, , 2005b Stutsman et al., 2006) to hide a message in the errors (noise) that are naturally encountered in a machine translation (MT). This approach embeds a message by performing a substitution procedure on the translated text using translation variations of multiple MT systems. In addition, it inserts popular errors of MT systems and also uses synonym substitutions in order to increase the bitrate. Unlike synonyms-based steganography, linguistic flaws in noise-based approach are not a concern unless they appear excessively. However, the authors state that one of the concerns is that the continual improvement of MT may narrow the margin of hiding data. In addition, translation-based approach, as pointed out in Grothoff (2005a Grothoff ( , 2005b and Stutsman et al. (2006) , cannot be applied to all languages because of the fundamental structures are radically different. This generates severely incoherent and unreadable text (Grothoff, 2005a (Grothoff, , 2005b Stutsman et al., 2006) .
The following example (Stutsman et al., 2006) of translation-based renders linguistically illegitimate and long text just to hide the two letters 'hi':
That bourgeoisie has played a most revolutionary role in who history. The Bourgeoisie, Where they has to the rule come, all feudalen, patriarchalischen, idyllischen conditions destroys. The Bourgeoisie undressed every venerable and activities of their holy light regarded cum pious shyness. It has the physician, the lawyer, the pfaffen, the poet, whom man of the science transforms into her paid hired hands. The Bourgeoisie tore their agitate-sentimental veil from the family relationship off and attributed it at on pure money relationship. The bourgeoisie has revealed like the brutal Kraftaeusserung which admires the reaction on the Middle Ages so much in which traegsten Baerenhaeuterei found its suitable addition. Only she has proved what which activity of which people can manage. It has completely different wonder works achieved than Egyptian pyramids, Roman water pipelines and gotische cathedrals, it completely different courses implemented than people migrations and crusades. Which bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing that instruments of production, and thereby which relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. An unchanged retention of that old production way was which first existence condition of all former industrial classes against this. The continual circulation of production, the continuous vibration of all social conditions, the eternal uncertainty and movement distinguish the Bourgeoisepoche before all different. The need for always more extensive sales for her products chases that bourgeoisie over that whole world.
Another noise-based approach called confusing approach has been proposed by Topkara et al. (2007) . The approach basically employs typos and ungrammatical abbreviations in a text, e.g., emails, blogs, forums, etc., for hiding data. Moreover, Shirali-Shahreza et al. (2007) have introduced an abbreviation-based scheme to conceal data using the short message service (SMS) of mobile phones. Due to size constraints of SMS and the use of phone keypad instead of the keyboard, a new language called SMS-texting was defined to make the approach more practical. However, these approaches are sensitive to the amount of noise (errors) that occurs in a human writing. Such shortcoming not only increases the vulnerability of the approach but also narrows the margin of hiding data. The following example of the confusing approach (Topkara et al., 2007) renders the long text that linguistically retains inadequate quality along with illegitimate level of flaws, just to hide the 16 bits:
A substantial portion of the text available online is of a kind that tends to contain mane typos and ungrammatical abbreviations, e.g., emails, blogs, forums. It is therefore not surprising chat, in suck tests, one can tarry out information-hiding by the judicious injection of tyros. The resilience is achieved through the use of computationally asymmetric transformations (CAT for short): Transformations that can be married out inexpensively, yet reversing them requires much mere extensive semantic analyses (easy for humans to carry out, but hark to automate).
Non-textual steganography
A number of steganography approaches employs non-text-based covers such as digital images and audio files. Image steganography is based on manipulating digital images to conceal a message. Such manipulation often renders the message as noise. In general, image steganography suffers from several issues such as the potential of distortion, the significant size limitation of the messages that can be embedded, and the increased vulnerability to detection through digital image processing techniques (Martin et al., 2005) . Audio-covers have also been pursued. Example of audio steganography techniques include LSB (Cvejic and Seppanen, 2004a; 2004b) , spread spectrum coding Kirovski and Malvar, 2005) , phase coding Ansari et al., 2004) , and echo hiding (Ansari et al., 2004; Gruhl et al., 1996) . In general, these techniques are too complex, and like their image-based counterpart, are still subject to distortion and are vulnerable to detection (Johnson and Katzenbeisser, 1999; Martin et al.,2005; Cvejic and Seppanen, 2004b; Petitcolas, 1999) . The hidden message may become to a great extent a foreign body in the cover and thus makes those schemes vulnerable to detection. In addition, image and audio steganography schemes rely on private or restricted access to the original unaltered cover in order to avoid the potential of comparison attacks, which is considered a major threat to the covert communication. Basically, an adversary can detect the presence of a hidden message by comparing a particular image-cover or audio-cover to the original image or audio file and finding out that some alterations have been made. It is worth noting that these techniques most likely use a stega-key as a password to prevent the revelation of an embedded message.
Games, TCP/IP packets, and storage media have also been pursued as steganographic carriers. Exploiting the use of games to hide messages has been considered by Hernandez-Castro et al. (2006) . Basically, game scripts are suggested as covers where messages are hidden in moves or comments. However, this work provides limited options for concealing messages and has considered neither the coding implication on the sequence of moves nor the use of authenticated data in terms of documented tournaments and games among known players. Only fabricated games are pursued as covers. In addition, the proposed approach is vulnerable to contrast attacks where the sequence of moves does not logically match the game flow, mostly caused by the message concealment process. Moreover, it is vulnerable to comparison and traffic attacks. In addition, Handel and Sandford (1996) exploit the unused space in the header of TCP/IP packets to hide and deliver data across the internet. The TCP packet header has six unused (reserved) bits and the IP packet header has two reserved bits. There are tremendous packets are transmitted over the internet can convey and transmit a secret data. On the other hand, hiding information in an unused or reserved space in computer systems (Anderson et al., 1998; ScramDisk, 2008) . For example, Windows 95 operating system has around 31 KB unused hidden space which can be used to hide data. Another example, unused space in file headers of image, audio, etc., can also be used to hide data. However, these techniques are detectable and vulnerable to distortion attack (Johnson and Katzenbeisser, 1999; Kessler, 2004; Petitcolas, 1999) .
Nostega paradigm
This section describes the novel paradigm for designing steganography scheme, namely, Nostega [Desoky, 2008a [Desoky, , 2009a ]. Nostega opts to make the presence of the hidden data natural in the cover so that neither linguistic flaws nor peculiarity are introduced as a side effect. In addition, Nostega strives to legitimatise the interaction among the communicating parties so that an adversary would not suspect the association between a sender and a receiver. To illustrate the basic concept behind Nostega, consider the following scenario.
Bob and Alice are on a spy mission. Bob and Alice must appear like any other ordinary people. To emphasise, in general any ordinary person has a profession and personal interests. Before they went on a mission that requires them to reside in two different countries, they plot a strategic plan and set the rules for communicating covertly using their profession and interests as a steganographic umbrella. Bob is a professor and Alice is a student. They basically agree on concealing messages in educational documents by naturally manipulating questions and answers that legitimately occur in lecture notes, exam samples, homework, examples, etc., to embed data in such a way a text-cover (edu-cover) looks unsuspicious. They make sure that a text-cover every time is generated has different content and meaning while it remains legitimate to avoid suspicion of using steganographical tool. To make this work, Professor Bob has the right to post the text-cover (e.g., lecture notes, sample exams, homework, examples, etc.) for his students. On the other hand, Alice is one of Bob's online-students, which legitimises the communications with Bob. When Bob wants to send a covert message to Alice, Bob either posts text-cover online for authorised students to access or he can send it via email to the intended students. Covert messages concealed and transmitted in this manner will not look suspicious because the relationship between Bob and Alice is legitimate. Furthermore, Alice is not the sole recipient of Bob's messages; other non-spy students also receive their educational documents further warding off suspicion.
When Alice decides to send Bob a message, she does it in the same manner as Bob, except she uses her role as a student to do so. She posts educational documents such as her solution of homework, if it is legitimate to do so, and other related documents that Bob or anyone else can access, or she sends them via email to the professor. These educational documents conceal data. However, only Bob and Alice will be able unravel the hidden message because they know the rules of the game. The communications of both Bob and Alice looks legitimate and nothing is suspicious because of the justification of the relationship between the communicating parties. Alice and Bob are using real data from their academic field to make their covert communications legitimate. Note that even after a class is over such relationship can still play a role such as a student become interested in a particular topic and pursue it as a profession (e.g., PhD students). On the other hand, if Bob and Alice communicate using ciphertext, suspicion can easily be raised and thus the steganographic goal will be defeated. The above scenario shows how Nostega methodology can be effective in achieving the steganographical goal. In summary, Nostega conceal data in a steganographic cover that looks legitimate like any other ordinary material then it transmits the cover though an established covert channel such as the legitimate and innocent relationship between Bob and Alice in the above scenario. 
The architecture of Nostega
Nostega achieves legitimacy by basing the camouflage of both a message and its transmittal on a particular field such as education, economics, graphs, games, etc. As stated earlier, in the above example of Bob and Alice, using a particular profession or relationship gives legitimacy for camouflaging both a message and its transmittal. The core idea of Nostega paradigm is basically camouflaging messages by embedding them in a form of noiseless data by employing either an altered authenticated data or legitimate of untraceable data, as shown in Section 3. The following is an overview of the Nostega architecture, which consisted of five modules as shown in Figure 1: 1 Steganographic field determination (Module 1): Determines the fields such as education, economics, graphs, games, etc. for achieving the steganographic goal. One of the major selection criteria is how the steganographic field facilitates the process of generating a noiseless cover in which the data is naturally embedded so that the cover looks innocent raising no suspicion and the hidden message is undetectable. Note that the process of Module 1 is only involved at the stage of constructing Nostega-based system. 4 Implementing cover generator (Module 4): Constructing a cover generator or using a contemporary tool that is capable of achieving the steganographical goal. For instance, if the cover is graphs such as charts then employing a tool that is used by a wide variety of people such as Microsoft Excel maybe a good option in order to generate a steganographic cover that looks an ordinary graph. On the other hand, if the cover is chess then chess software such as Chessmaster (Desoky and Younis, 2009 ) may legitimise the steganographic cover.
Implementing communications protocol and covert channel (Module 5):
Configures the basic protocol of how a sender and a recipient would communicate covertly. It includes the covert channel for delivering a Nostega-based cover between the communicating parties along with the decoder scheme to unravel a hidden message. A covert channel can be based on a justifiable reason as in the scenario of Bob and Alice discussed above.
Advantages of Nostega
Nostega promotes the camouflaging of both a message and its transmittal. Nostega neither hides data in a noise (errors) nor produces noise rendering the generated cover noiseless. Instead, it conceals messages in a form of noiseless dada in the generated cover using either unaltered authenticated data or untraceable data thus avoiding wide varieties of attacks. The concealment process of Nostega has no effect on the linguistics of the generated cover if text is used as a steganographic carrier rendering such text-cover legitimate. Unlike other approaches like translation-based it can be applied to all languages. For steganographic carriers, Nostega uses materials such as graphs, text, games, etc., which have plenty of room for concealing data. The implemented metrologies that are based on Nostega paradigm are keyless schemes. Yet, Nostega is a public paradigm, which implies that it is resilient even when an adversary is well familiar with this new paradigm. It is observed that a steganographic system is based on Nostega is capable of fooling both machine and human examinations.
Nostega paradigm-based methodology
The main contribution of the modern steganography is the novel Nostega paradigm [Desoky, 2008a [Desoky, , 2009a ]. Unlike all other approaches, Nostega neither hides data in a noise nor produces noise rendering the generated cover noiseless. Instead, it camouflages messages in a form of unquestionable data in the generated cover employing either unaltered authenticated data or untraceable data thus avoiding wide varieties of attacks. The concealment process of Nostega has no effect on the linguistics of the generated cover if text is used as a steganographic carrier rendering such text-cover legitimate. Unlike other approaches like translation-based, Nostega can be applied to all languages. Nostega is also capable of employing wide variety of materials and cover-types such as graphs, games, text, etc., which have plenty of room for concealing data without creating noise. Based on this paradigm, several novel methodologies have been developed and validated. The implemented methodologies that are based on Nostega paradigm are keyless schemes. Yet, Nostega is a public paradigm, which implies that it is resilient even when an adversary is well familiar with this new paradigm. The Nostega-based methodologies are demonstrated in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
Linguistics Nostega-based methodologies
The novel linguistics Nostega-based methodologies are as follows: Edustega methodology [Desoky, 2009a, in process (a) ], Sumstega methodology (Desoky et al., 2009) , Listega methodology (Desoky, 2009b) , Notestega methodology (Desoky, 2009c) , Matlist methodology (Desoky, 2009a , Desoky and Younis, 2008 and methodology . These linguistics Nostega-based methodologies are detailed next.
Edustega methodology
The high demand for educational documents by a wide variety of people, in both the academic and non-academic spheres, creates a high volume of traffic, which makes an adversary's job impractical to investigate all of them. Hence, such huge traffic, due to the normal frequent exchange of educational documents in both electronic and printed formats, allows communicating parties to establish a covert channel to securely transmit hidden messages. This renders educational documents an attractive steganographic carrier. Therefore, the novel educational-based steganography methodology (Edustega) takes advantages of such text to conceal data [Desoky, 2009a, in process (a) ; Younis, 2008, 2006] . Edustega is based on Nostega paradigm, which implies that it neither hides data in a noise (errors) nor produces noise. Instead, it camouflages data in educational documents by manipulating, mainly but not limited to, questions and answers of (e.g., multiple-choice, true-or-false, fill-in-the-space, matching, etc.) exams, examples, puzzles, competitions, etc., in order to embed data without generating any suspicious pattern. Such materials have an adequate room for concealing data where the observed bitrate by the experimental results of the current implementation is superior to all contemporary linguistic steganography approaches, as shown in Table 1 . It can be applied to all languages. The presented implementation, validation, and experimental results confirmed that Edustega methodology is capable of achieving the steganographical goal. 
Edu-cover sample
The edu-cover in this sample conceals the 34 bits '01010101011100110110010 10010000001' using a GRE sentence completions question generated using [Desoky, 2009a, in process (a) ; GRE Sentence Completions, 2008] .
The pressure of population on available resources is the key to understanding history, consequently any historical writing that does not take cognisance of _________ facts is _________ flawed.
A demographic intrinsically B guard weak C national object D keen feeling E joint congenial
Sumstega methodology
The high demand for reading while no one has time to read everything has fuelled the necessity of automatic summarisation systems in business, science, World Wide Web, education, news, etc. As a result, the popular use of summaries by a wide variety of people creates a high volume of traffic for accessing and generating summaries. Such huge traffic makes an adversary's job impractical to investigate all of them and allows communicating parties to establish a secure covert channel to transmit steganographic covers. This renders summaries an attractive steganographic carrier. Therefore, the novel summarisation-based steganography methodology (Sumstega) takes advantage of the automatic summarisation techniques to generate summary-cover [Desoky, 2009a , in process (a); Desoky et al., 2008] . Sumstega neither hides data in a noise (errors) nor produces noise. Instead, it camouflages data in the natural and legitimate variations that are produced by automatic summarisation techniques, which retains adequate rooms for concealing data. Basically, Sumstega manipulates the parameters and factors of automatic summarisation techniques (PFAST) in order to embed a message without violating the pattern of an automated summary (Jones, 2007; Mani and Maybury, 1999; Marcu, 2000; Mani, 2001) . It exploits PFAST, such as the weight (e.g., weight of frequency, location, semantic), paraphrasing, truncation, reordering, semantic and information equivalency, etc., to generate summary-cover that looks legitimate. Virtually, it generates different legitimate summaries for the same document(s) then it generates summary-cover, which conceal data, by embedding the different elements (e.g., sentences, words) from these peer summaries. This process is done in such a way that the summary-cover appears as an ordinary automated summary. The presented implementation of Sumstega scheme, in Desoky et al. (2008) , may achieve bitrate roughly from 0.064% up to 0.20%. The implementation, validation, and experimental results demonstrated that Sumstega methodology is capable of achieving the steganographical goal [Desoky, 2009a , in process (a); Desoky et al., 2008] .
Summary-cover sample
The summary-cover sample is generated by an actual implementation of the Sumstega methodology, which conceals eight bits '01011000'. In this implementation, Sumstega employs publicly accessible auto-summarisation tools (Microsoft Word 97; SRA Corporation; http://www.objectssearch.com/summary/index.jsp; LTRC; Hassel and Dalianis; Inxight Summarizer; TIME Magazine) that are capable of generating dissimilar high-level summaries, i.e., they apply different sentence extraction techniques. The news article TIME Magazine is then picked as a base document for which summaries are generated using these tools. The summaries are not included due to space constraints.
Figure 2
The cover-text generated by Sumstega using four different extraction-based auto-summaries "London was on high alert on the morning that police surveillance teams stationed outside an apartment block in South London spotted de Menezes leaving his building on his way to work. The police were looking for Hussain Osman, whose address was in the same building as de Menezes, and had attempted to bomb the Shepherd's Bush London tube station the previous day. Terror attacks on July 7 had killed 52 commuters, and just the previous day, more suspects had gone on the run after devices they planted on London's public transport network failed to explode. Amid those basic facts, a host of questions have arisen about police procedures under pressure and their response to finding themselves under investigation. When he boarded a train, they cornered him and shot him with special bullets designed to cause maximum physical damage. The court's verdict leaves the Metropolitan Police facing a penalty and legal costs that together amount to about $1.1 million."
Listega methodology
The use of textual list of items e.g., products, subjects, books, etc., is widely popular and linguistically legible. This motivates the development of the novel Listega methodology (Desoky, 2009b) . Listega takes advantage of such use of textual list to camouflage data by exploiting itemised data to conceal messages. Simply, it encodes a message then assigns it to legitimate items in order to generate a text-cover in a form of list. The generated list of items, the text-cover, can be embedded among other legitimate non-coded items for more protection based on a predetermined protocol among communicating parties such as read every other item, every fifth item, or any other way than the use of particular sequence. Listega neither hides data in a noise (errors) nor produces noise. Instead, it camouflages data by manipulating noiseless list of legitimate items. Listega establishes a covert channel among communicating parties by employing justifiably reasons based on the common practice of using textual list of items in order to achieve unsuspicious transmission of generated covers. The presented implementation, validation, and steganalysis of Listega demonstrated: the robustness capabilities of achieving the steganographic goal, the adequate room for concealing data, and the superior bitrate of roughly 1.32% up to 3.87% than all contemporary linguistic steganography approaches (Desoky, 2009b) . This bitrate is achieved using similar encoding techniques to Edustega encoder in Desoky [2009a, in process (a) ]. Obviously, the encoding technique is not an essential contribution for any steganographic scheme whether it is Edustega or Listega methodology. The encoding technique was just for example presentation purposes only. Nonetheless, the bitrate may differ from one implementation to another. 
List-cover sample
The list-cover sample demonstrates the effectiveness and efficiency of Listega. As shown, in the list-cover sample each item conceals four bites according to the presented implementation in Desoky (2009b) . As observed, the use such legitimate list of items e.g., products, subjects, books, etc., is widely popular, linguistically legible, and unsuspicious. For example, one may consider the list of songs on the internet as shown in Figure 3 , which is a screenshots from List of Songs at Yahoo Answers. Note, obviously the list of songs in Figure 3 does not contain a hidden message and was just an innocent and common practice by people like songs. On the other hand, Figure 4 details the camouflage of the encoded message 'get him' (Desoky, 2009b) . The binary of this message is: Desoky (2009b) 
Notestega methodology
The wide use of notes in business, science, education, news, etc., renders notes an attractive steganographic carriers, and it allows the communicating parties to establish a covert channel that is capable of transmitting messages in an unsuspicious way. Therefore, the novel Notestega methodology takes advantage of the recent advances in automatic notetaking techniques to generate a text-cover (Desoky, 2009c) . Notestega neither exploits noise (errors) to embed a message nor produces a detectable noise. Instead, it pursues the variations among both human-notes and the outputs of automatic-notetaking techniques to conceal data. Unlike MT and automatic summariser, Notestega can embed non-directly related elements to its output including linguistic elements (e.g., sentences, words, abbreviations, etc.), and non-linguistic elements (e.g., lines, stars, arrows, symbols, etc.), and thus the generated note-cover (text-cover) has an ample room of concealing data. Such text generation is carefully done in order to avoid the introduction of a suspicious pattern while embedding a message. The presented implementation and steganalysis validation of Notestega demonstrate distinct capabilities of achieving the steganographic goal (Desoky, 2009c) , an adequate room for concealing data, and a superior bitrate to all contemporary linguistic steganography approaches which is roughly 7.777%.
Note-cover sample
The presented sample, is based on the chosen topic of logic and computer design notes, demonstrates the robustness of Notestega. As observed, the note-cover looks legitimate like an ordinary note. It is worth looking at how other notes that do not contain a hidden message may look like as shown in Figure 5 , which is a screenshots from (Notetaking System, 2008). The following sample in Figure 6 conceals eight bits of the binary string '01011000' (Desoky, 2009c) . Note, due to space constraints only high-level approaches are used to illustrate the implementation of Notestega. In, addition this can also be embedded among other classnotes of logic and computer design. 
Matlist methodology (Matlist)
The generated text by NLG and template systems is meaningful and looks legitimate. Therefore, the novel Matlist methodology employs NLG and template techniques along with RS values, e.g., binary, decimal, hexadecimal, octal, alphabetic, alphanumeric, etc., of DSS to generate noiseless text-cover [Desoky, 2009a [Desoky, , in process (a), 2008b . This type of DSS, e.g., financial, medical, mathematical, scientific, economical, etc., has plenty of room to conceal data and allows communicating parties to establish a covert channel such as a relationship based on the profession of the communication parties to transmit a text-cover. Matlist embeds data in a form of RS values, function of RS, related semantics of RS, a combination of these, etc. Unlike synonym-based approach, Matlist does not preserve the meaning of text-cover every time it is used. Instead, Matlist cover retains different legitimate meaning for each message while it remains semantically coherent and rhetorically sound. The presented implementation, validation, and experimental results demonstrate that Matlist is capable of accomplishing the steganographical goal with higher bitrate than all other linguistic steganography approaches. The bitrate may differ from one implementation to another and from one DSS to another. Nonetheless, the current five different implementations of five different DSS achieve superior bitrate to all contemporary linguistic steganography approaches (Desoky, 2008b; , as shown in Table 2 . 
Matlist-cover sample
In this implementation example, Matlist predetermines the Matlist encoder to encode a message based on the DSS specifications of the CPI. Matlist encoder employs a PSM encoder (Desoky and Younis, 2006 ) without encryption to assist in generating the Matlist code. Matlist employs a PSM encoder to convert the plaintext message to a binary message then grouping its binary in lengths of seven digits. The grouping in lengths of seven digits will result in a value of 0 up to 127 in decimal. In other words, changing the value from 0000000 up to 1111111 in binary. Matlist encoder employs an index that starts from 1 referring to 0 in integer (in binary 0000000) to 128 referring to 127 in integer (in binary 1111111). Matlist encoder uses this index technique to avoid the occurrence of the value of zero in the encoded messages (the Matlist code, which is in an RS form). This index plays a role as if Matlist encoder adds 1 to each value after PSM encodes the message, for more information refer to [Desoky, 2009a [Desoky, , in process (a), 2008b Younis, 2008, 2006] . The following Figure 7 shows a Matlist cover sample (Desoky, 2008b Younis, 2008, 2006) . Source: Desoky (2008b A similar text example of the DSS of Consumer Prices Index (CPI) is presented in (Notetaking System, 2008 ; US Bureau of Labor Statistics; Consumer Price Index). This text is authenticated and was written by human and the source as shown is the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (Notetaking System, 2008 ; US Bureau of Labor Statistics). Obviously, the sample of CPI is not written for concealing a message, but it was only written for CPI purposes. It is explicit to show how the DSS of CPI looks like. Evidently, collecting the numerical values in this sample will form a RS that is constrained by its domain. However, it is still in the form of RS. Apparently, the text is just a linguistic description of the fluctuations among the values and shows that CPI is an appropriate DSS to be employed by Matlist methodology as demonstrated (Desoky, 2008b .
NORMALS methodology
Text-cover of contemporary linguistic steganography approaches has numerous flaws such as incorrect syntax, lexicon, rhetoric, and grammar. Additionally, the content of text-cover is often meaningless and semantically incoherent. Such detectable noise (flaws) by both human and machine examinations can easily raise suspicion. These deficiencies render contemporary approaches highly vulnerable. Unlike all other approaches, the NORMALS methodology neither generates noise nor uses noisy text to camouflage data, as shown in Figure 8 . NORMALS employs NLG techniques to generate noiseless (flawless) and legitimate text-cover by manipulating the inputs' parameters of NLG system in order to camouflage data in the generated text. As a result, NORMALS is capable of fooling both human and machine examinations. Unlike Matlist, NORMALS is capable of handling non-RS domains.
In NORMALS, the bitrate may differ from one NLG system to another; however, the normal scheme presented achieves bitrate of 0.20% by encoding only the external inputs. Obviously, by encoding both internal and external inputs of NORMALS NLGS, the bitrate will definitely be increased. This bitrate is lower than the bitrate of other approaches. However, linguistically NORMALS is superior to mimic functions and NICETEXT. In the translation-based approach, the continual improvement of MT will eliminate the use of the translation-based approach until it is obsolete. Inversely, improvements in NLG systems will make NORMALS stable and attractive for future use. it is meaningful, syntactically correct, lexically valid, rhetorically sound, semantically coherent, and looks legitimate
Smoking Information for Hayman Latham
Dear Hayman Latham Thank you for taking the trouble to return the smoking questionnaire that we sent you. In it you said that you're not planning to stop smoking in the next six months. However, you would like to be a non-smoker if it was easy to stop. Many people like you have been able to stop and you could too if you really wanted to. We hope this information will be of interest to you.
It's easier to stop if you WANT to... You like to smoke because:
• It helps to break up your working time.
• It stops you putting on weight.
• It helps you to relax.
• It helps you cope with stress.
• It is something you do when you are bored.
• It is something to do with friends and family.
• It stops you getting withdrawal symptoms.
You don't like smoking because:
• It is bad for your health.
• It makes you less fit.
• It is a bad example for children.
• It is expensive.
• It is bad for the health of those near you.
• It is unpleasant for people near you.
• It makes your clothes and breath smell. • You have stopped before for more than a month.
• You are a light smoker.
• You have good reasons for stopping smoking.
• You expect support from your workmates.
We know that all of these make it more likely that you will be able to stop. Most people who stop smoking for good have more than one attempt. It's often easier than you think... You said in your questionnaire that you might find it difficult to stop because you would put on weight. A few people do put on some weight. If you did stop smoking, your appetite would improve and you would taste your food much better. Because of this it would be wise to plan in advance so that you're not reaching for the biscuit tin all the time. Remember that putting on weight is an overeating problem, not a no-smoking one. You can tackle it later with diet and exercise. You also said that you might find it difficult to stop because your partner and a lot of your friends smoke. When lots of people around you are smoking it can be more difficult to stop, but not impossible. Many people have managed. If you decide to stop, tell your family and friends. Some of them might want to stop as well and you can help each other. If not, think what they could do to help and ask for their support. They might decide to stop when they see that you have succeeded. For you, another difficulty with stopping is that smoking helps you cope with stress. Many people think that cigarettes help them cope with stress. Taking a cigarette only makes you feel better for a short while. Most ex-smokers feel calmer and more in control than they did when they were smoking. And finally... We hope this letter will help you to think more about the benefits of stopping smoking tobacco. Many people who feel like you do now, do eventually stop smoking. Although it might be hard, if you really want to stop you will be able to do it. With best wishes, The SToP Team.
SMOKELINE is the Scottish helpline for stopping smoking. Calls are free and there is someone to speak to between 12 noon and 12 midnight. The phone number is: 0800 84 84 84
Note: These are some of NORMALS' advantages making it capable of fooling both human and computer examinations.
Improving NORMALS' bitrate
As stated above, by encoding both internal and external inputs of the NORMALS NLGS, the bitrate definitely will be increased. In the presented NORMALS scheme, the bitrate achieved was based on the use of encoding only the external inputs. Encoding the internal-inputs and increasing the amount of linguistics used definitely will increase the bitrate. For instance, a technique such as text substitution can be employed by NORMALS where words or a combination of words can be substituted with other words or combinations of words. Maximising the amount of linguistics and using text substitution (e.g., words, sentences, etc.) will obviously increase the bitrate. The technique of text substitution is similar to the semantic substitution of NICETEXT (Chapman and Davida, 1997; Chapman et al., 2001; Davida, 2202, 2007) . However, semantic substitution has been used by other steganographical approaches, but unfortunately they cause detectable noise which makes their approaches fail (Grothoff et al., 2005a (Grothoff et al., , 2005b Stutsman et al., 2006) . Unlike all other steganographical approaches where the use of text substitution causes semantic errors, NORMALS does not cause any errors when it employs any text substitution techniques. NORMALS methodology is based on NLG techniques where these techniques ensure the production of legitimate text. NORMALS text substitution (NTS) is a feature in NORMALS that gives it the advantage of being flexible in generating the NORMALS cover and it increases the NORMALS' bitrate.
Bitrate
The aim of this section is to compare the bitrate of contemporary linguistic steganography approaches to that achieved by Nostega paradigm. The bitrate is defined as the size of the hidden message relative to the size of the cover. Table 3 shows the bitrate achieved in the implemented samples of Nostega-based methodologies. It is worth noting that the bitrate differs from one methodology to another and from one implementation to another as indicated in Table 3 , which categorises them based on the methodology used. Table 3 The bitrate of the implemented samples of Nostega-based methodologies
To put these bitrate figures in perspective, the bitrate of contemporary linguistic steganography approaches has been investigated. The following reports on the findings, categorising them based on the pursued approaches. Table 4 provides a concise summary of these findings.
1 The statistical-based approach, namely mimic functions: An experiment has been conducted using 30 samples generated using Spam Mimic (1999) . An average bitrate of 0.90% is observed.
2 Synonym-based approaches:
• For the NICETEXT scheme, the samples in Davida (1997, 2002) are used to estimate the bitrate, which is found to be approximately 0.29%.
• The Winstein's scheme (Winstein, 2008a (Winstein, , 2008b ) roughly hides about six bits per sentence, which yields a bitrate of approximately 0.5% based on the sentences listed in these publications. However, this rate cannot be generalised since not every sentence in the text-cover conceals data. In addition, the size of sentences will affect the bitrate because there are short and long sentences. Nonetheless, the 0.5% figure is assumed given that it is based on the samples developed by the authors.
• The capability of the scheme of Murphy and Vogel (2007) again is reported as the number of bits per sentence. Based on the samples provided in their publication, the achievable bitrate is roughly 0.30% per sentence.
• Nakagawa et al. (2001) have provided two samples for their scheme. The samples achieve bitrate of 0.06% and 0.12% respectively. However, it has been noted that when tried in a real application, only a bitrate of 0.034% could be reached.
3 Noise-based approaches:
• The bitrate for the translation-based scheme reported in Stutsman et al. (2006) claimed to be capable of hiding few bits in a file of several kilobytes, which yields an extremely low bitrate. Table 4 The bitrate of contemporary linguistic steganography approaches
Approach Bitrate Comment
Mimic functions (Wayner, 1992 (Wayner, , 2002 0.90% Based on 30 samples generated at http://www.spamimc.com NICETEXT Davida, 1997, 2002) 0.29% Based on the samples in the cited papers Winstein (2008a Winstein ( , 2008b 0.5% Based on the samples in the cited papers, and also confirmed in Murphy and Vogel (2007) Murphy and Vogel (2007) Comparing Tables 3 and 4 , it is obvious that Nostega-based methodologies achieve much more superior bitrate than all comparable approaches, making it a very effective steganography paradigm. The high bitrate also enables the use of reasonable cover sizes, which it is a major concern for all steganography approaches whether it is linguistic or non-linguistic technique. The only low bitrate may appear with Nostega paradigm is in the Sumstega methodology in Desoky et al. (2008) . Obviously, the bitrate may differ from one type of summarisation techniques to another and from one implementation to another etc. Nonetheless, the presented implementation of Sumstega scheme may achieve bitrate roughly from 0.064% up to 0.20% and with an approximate average of 0.12%. The bitrate may appear slightly lower than other approaches e.g., mimic functions, NICETEXT, translation-based, etc., that are mentioned in Table 4 . However, the generated text-cover by Sumstega as observed retains superior qualities than contemporary approaches. In addition, this bitrate is limited to only the current implementation example, which employs only one type of summarisation technique, namely an extraction technique. However, there are numerous summarisation techniques (Jones, 2007; Mani and Maybury, 1999; Marcu, 2000; Mani, 2001 ) that can be employed by Sumstega such as abstraction, revision, discourse, paraphrasing rule, semantic equivalency, information equivalency, cross-lingual, multi-document, information retrieval, etc. Obviously, employing such techniques can easily increase the bitrate.
Non-linguistics Nostega-based methodologies
This section highlights the key features of the non-linguistics Nostega-based metrologies: Graphstega and Chestega.
Graphstega methodology
Graphstega methodology is the science and art of avoiding the arousal of suspicion in covert communications by concealing a message in a novel cover type namely graph-cover Younis, 2008, 2006; Desoky, 2009a, in process (a) ]. It camouflages messages noiselessly as plotted data. Graphs are a highly suitable Nostega-based cover because of the popular usage of graphs in a wide variety of domains, e.g., business, education, news, etc., and the tremendous amount of graphs make the investigation and detection of a hidden message extremely difficult if not impossible. Briefly, once a Graphstega system is constructed, Graphstega camouflages a message in two steps. First, it encodes a message in a form that can be camouflaged in a graph. Second, it represents the steganographic code (the encoded message) in a graph as data points. Graphstega is resilient to all contemporary attacks, such as traffic analysis, contrast, and comparison attack, even when launched by an adversary who is familiar with Graphstega. Figure 9 shows a graph-cover sample that conceals a long message and lists its relevant characteristics. The message is the CPI of July and August 2007 (US Bureau of Labor Statistics), the size of the long message is 47.5 KB. It is encoded by applying PSM encoder (Desoky and Younis, 2006; Jones, 2007) using groups of eight bits, i.e., each decimal number is in range [0, 255] . The frequency of appearance of the decimal numbers in the range [1, 81] is plotted and portrayed as packet delay measures of an experiment. The graph can be inserted as an object in a MS Word document. The recipient can double click the graph in order to open the accompanied excel file, access the row data and finally decode the message. It is argued that most published steganography approaches would highly recommend small messages to avoid detection since they embed them as noise. The current implemented Graphstega system achieves bitrate for concealing long and short messages is 4.37% and 1.0061%, respectively. Obviously, the bitrate of Graphstega may differ from one implementation to another. As shown by the example in Figure 9 , Graphstega is in fact superior to contemporary steganography when it comes to effectiveness and flexibility in concealing all sorts of messages. 
Graph-cover sample

Chestega methodology
This section yet presents another novel methodology based on the Nostega paradigm, the novel Chestega methodology, that exploits popular game domains such as chess, checkers, crosswords, domino, etc., to conceal messages [Desoky and Younis, 2009; Desoky, 2008a Desoky, , 2009a ]. Game-cover (chess-cover) can be in a form of training documents, game analysis, news articles, or any other form of games that is cable of camouflaging data [Desoky and Younis, 2009; Desoky, 2008a Desoky, , 2009a ].
Since it is based on Nostega, Chestega does not exploit noise to embed a message nor produce a detectable noise. Instead, authenticated data can be employed in the cover, which makes it resilient to comparison attacks. It is demonstrated the feasibility of employing authenticated chess cover, e.g., authenticated chess game that is generated by Chessmaster 8000, to conceal data. Chestega is also a public approach that neither relies on the secrecy of its technique, nor need to employ a stega-key. The implementation and validation, and experimental results, as shown in Desoky and Younis (2009 ) and Desoky [2008a , 2009a ], demonstrate that Chestega is capable of achieving the steganographical goal.
Figure 10
The chess cover that conceal 'he doesn't love you' using a chessboard-based encoding (see online version for colours)
Chess-cover sample
Chess is a very popular game that appeals to people of all ages worldwide. In addition to international competitions, there are numerous local, regional and national chess tournaments almost every where. Chess games are reported and rated by an international chess federation and/or some local organisation. To standardise the storage and reporting chess games, they are represented using specific keywords and syntax, called the Portable Game Notation (PGN). PGN is not the only chess notation that exists. However, in this example PGN is used since it is the official and most popular chess notation. Chestega averts suspicion in covert communication by concealing a message using chess data. Chess data in this context includes chessboard positions, pieces and their colour, moves, tournament name, place and results, players, etc. This data can be exploited to conceal a message within a script of moves in a game, teaching sessions, game analysis, etc. The chess data can be authenticated, e.g., citing actual games or tournaments, players, etc., or fabricated as part of teaching material or a made-up scenario. The fabricated data does not always have to look normal and legitimate, e.g., reflecting only legal moves, instead it may be in a form of a natural noise, e.g., an illegal move or a position, the use of illegal moves is often pursued by the chess community for teaching purposes.
The Chestega cover can be in a form of a graph, e.g., game statistics, image, e.g., snap shot of the chessboard during a game, text, e.g., teaching of tactics, audio, e.g., game analysis, or a combination of these types. The tremendous volume of chess data in electronic and non-electronic format makes an adversary's job extremely difficult, if not impossible, and renders Chestega an effective steganography methodology. Figure 10 presents a chess-cover example.
Steganalysis validation
Steganalysis is the scientific art of defeating the steganographic goal (Johnson and Katzenbeisser, 1999; Kessler, 2004; Martin et al., 2005) . As stated before, the steganographic goal is not to prevent an adversary from decoding a hidden message, but to avoid an adversary from suspecting the existence of hidden data [Desoky, 2008a [Desoky, , 2009a ]. Thus, when using any steganographic technique if suspicion is raised, the goal of steganography is defeated regardless of whether or not a plaintext is revealed (Kessler, 2004; Hassel and Dalianis) . As such, the aim of this section is to briefly show what can be used to attack a steganographic technique and highlight how the methodologies, that are based on the Nostega paradigm, are resilient to possible attacks. It is assumed that an adversary will perform all possible investigations. In addition, the adversary is also aware of Nostega, as a public paradigm, but he does not know the detailed of Nostega-based system that the sender and recipient employ for their covert communication.
Traffic attack
One of the possible attacks an adversary may pursue is to analyse the communications traffic and the access patterns to publicly available or exchanged documents, images, graphs, files, etc. For example, the intelligence community has a number of tools at their disposal for analysing traffic on the internet, tracking access to websites, monitoring checked out literature from public libraries, etc. The main goal of a traffic attack is to detect unusual or questionable association between a sender and a recipient [Desoky, 2008a [Desoky, , 2009a [Desoky, , in process (a), 2010 [Desoky, , 2009b [Desoky, , 2009c Younis, 2008, 2009] . Traffic analysis intuitively can identify who communicates with whom. The relationship between the communicating parties will be then qualified based on the contents of the message. Traffic attacks can be applied to any contemporary steganography techniques regardless of the cover type (e.g., image, graph, audio file, text, etc) and can achieve successful results with relatively low costs. In the context of Nostega, the subject of the cover is checked rather than its validity and consistency. If someone sends, receives, or accesses some materials without a legitimate reason for doing so, suspicion can be raised and further investigation may be warranted. The additional investigations will involve a thorough analysis of a steganographic cover, as detailed next.
Traffic analysis is deemed ineffective with Nostega-based methodologies [Desoky, 2008a [Desoky, , 2009a [Desoky, , in process (a), 2010 [Desoky, , 2009b [Desoky, , 2009c Younis, 2008, 2009] . These methodologies camouflage the transmittal of a hidden message to appear legitimate and thus suspicion is averted. Basically, Nostega ensures that the involved parties establish a covert communication channel by having a well-defined relationship with each other. For example in Edustega, the transmittal of a hidden message (edu-cover) is camouflaged in a way that makes the delivery of the steganographic cover to appear legitimate and thus suspicion is averted. Basically, Edustega ensures that the involved parties establish a covert channel by having a well-plotted relationship with each other. Analysing the traffic between them will not reveal any questionable association and will not trigger any further investigation. For instance, a professor, teacher, or student sends, posts, or access an educational material e.g., exams, homework, exercises, questions, etc., that belongs to his interest then suspicion is averted. In addition, the high demand for the material that is used to be a steganographic cover, e.g., educational documents, chess games, graphs, news summaries, etc., by a wide variety of people, creates a high volume of traffic that makes it impractical for an adversary to investigate all traffics. The voluminous traffic allows the communicating parties to establish a covert channel in order to transmit a Nostega-based cover without drawing attention, rendering it an attractive steganographic carrier. Finally, it is noted that if further investigations on a Nostega-based cover are triggered by traffic analysis, they would not be successful, as elaborated next. In Nostega, differentiating between a Nostega-based cover that contains hidden data and other peer materials without a hidden message is infeasible.
Contrast and comparison attacks
One of the intuitive sources of noise that may alert an adversary is the presence of contradictions [Desoky, 2008a [Desoky, , 2009a [Desoky, , in process (a), 2010 [Desoky, , 2009b [Desoky, , 2009c Younis, 2008, 2009] in the Nostega-based cover, such as finding inaccurate information in a particular cover, e.g., false information about a chess game or some naïve move made by a professional player. For instances, contradictions can also be spotted when using data that indicates a clear violation of the rules in either a chess game or a graph. The use of authenticated or untraceable data will definitely counter such an attack as used in the graph-cover. Untraceable data means data that matters only to a particular group or is shared privately, e.g., a game between two unknown amateurs, or numbers in a private chart that cannot be contrasted or compared. Meanwhile, noise in the context of comparison attacks reflects alteration of authenticated or previously used data. The goal is to find any incorrect and inconsistent data that may imply the manipulation of Nostega-based cover contents to include a hidden message. The vulnerability of Nostega-based cover to comparison attacks depends on how the cover is generated.
Employing an unaltered authenticated data makes the cover very resilient to this type of attacks. For example, Chestega demonstrates how a non-steganographic tool like Chessmaster has allowed the selection of authenticated and appropriate of moves and games that match an encoded message, and yet facilitated the generation of the game description and analysis. An adversary can not detect any discrepancy in a chess-cover when examining the authenticity of the data and the consistency of the text with respect to the style of what Chessmaster usually generates.
It is worth noting that the traffic analysis, discussed earlier, can also be pursued as a base for launching comparison attacks in case the data is not publicly accessible. In that case, current data is compared to a record of old data in order to search for any inconsistency over some period of time. Countering such an attack is always a challenge because it requires consistency with data that was previously used over an extended period of time. Contradictions would surely raise suspicion about the existence of a hidden message. Nostega, as demonstrated through examples in Desoky [2008a Desoky [ , 2009a Desoky [ , in process (a), 2010 Desoky [ , 2009b Desoky [ , 2009c and Younis (2008, 2009) , is simply made contrast-aware and comparison-aware. The flexibility in messages encoding and the ability of employing more than one cover type enable Nostega to easily avert such attacks.
Linguistics attacks
Linguistics attacks applies to Nostega-based methodologies, e.g., Chestega, Sumstega, Edustega, etc., that employ text covers [Desoky, 2008a [Desoky, , 2009a [Desoky, , in process (a), 2010 [Desoky, , 2009b [Desoky, , 2009c Younis, 2008, 2009] . Linguistics examination distinguishes the text that is under attack from normal human language. Distinguishing the text from normal human language can be done through the examination of meaning, syntax, lexicon, rhetoric, semantic, coherence, and any other issues that can help in detecting or suspecting the existence of a hidden message. These examinations are used to determine whether or not the text that is under attack is abnormal. Generally, the text produced by NLG systems, like the one used in Chessmaster by Chestega, usually meets the expected properties of a normal human language. This due to the fact that such text is prepared in advance and is subject to careful review. Thus, employing NLG systems in cover generation would prevent noises caused by linguistic flaws. For example, the chess-cover shown in the implementation of Chestega is generated by contemporary non-steganographical tools like Chessmaster, uses NLG system which makes it linguistically sound (free of errors) (Reiter and Dale, 2008) . Furthermore, if there are errors in the NLG engine, it should not be a concern for two reasons; first, it applies to all the generated text with and without a hidden message; second, nothing is concealed in errors. In addition, the use of contemporary non-steganographic tools that are publicly known makes it possible to fool an adversary that the stenographic cover is just an ordinary material. This was just an example when a Chestega is used. However, other text-covers generated by other schemes such as Sumstega and Edustega, obviously have no unusual patterns to be detected because they look very similar to their innocent peers that carry no hidden data. Therefore, Nostega paradigm is capable of passing any linguistic attack by both human and machine examinations [Desoky, 2008a [Desoky, , 2009a [Desoky, , in process (a), 2010 [Desoky, , 2009b [Desoky, , 2009c Younis, 2008, 2009] . For further statistical investigation refer [Desoky, 2009a, in process (a) ].
Conclusions and future work
This section highlights the following: the fundamental concepts of contemporary steganography in general and to the linguistic steganography approaches in particular, the current state of the research, the technical concerns, and the future directions for constructing steganography scheme. Steganography is the science and art of camouflaging the presence of covert communications. The steganographic goal is not to hinder the adversary from decoding a hidden message, but to prevent an adversary from suspecting the existence of covert communications. When using any steganographic technique if suspicion is raised, the goal of steganography is defeated regardless of whether or not a plaintext is revealed. Contemporary approaches are often classified based on the steganographic cover type into image, audio, graph, text, non-textual, etc. Textual steganography has become more favourable in recent years since the size of non-textual covers, e.g., image, audio, etc., is relatively large and is burdening the traffic of covert communications. Most of the published steganography approaches hiding data as noise in a cover that is assumed to look innocent, which embed a message by altering a digital image or an audio file with acclaim noticeable degradation. However, such alteration of authenticated covers can raise suspicion and the message is detectable regardless of whether or not a plaintext is revelled.
On the other hand, textual steganography approaches embed a message by imposing a steganographic process that generates a noisy text-cover. Textual steganography approaches are as follows: using series of words and characters, imitating the statistical profile of an existed text, exchanging synonyms, and exploiting errors in erroneous text. The vulnerability and concerns of these textual approaches, as explained in Section 2, can be summarised as follows. First, the textual-cover either introduce detectable flaws (noise), such as incorrect syntax, lexicon, rhetoric, grammar, etc., when generating a text-cover. Obviously, such flaws can raise suspicion about the presence of covert communications. Second, the content of the cover may be meaningless and semantically incoherent, and thus may draw suspicion. Third, the bitrate is very small. Since there is a limit on how many flaws a document may typically have, very large documents will be needed to hide few bytes of data. In fact this applies to non-textual approaches as well. Fourth, the bulk of the efforts have been focused on how to conceal a message and not on how to conceal the transmittal of the hidden message. In other words, the establishment of a covert communication channel has not been an integral part of most approaches found in the literature. Fifth, while these approaches may fool a computer examination, they often fail to pass human inspections. A successful textual steganography approach must be capable of passing both computer and human examinations. These concerns have motivated the development of the Nostega paradigm.
Nostega paradigm overcomes the faulty steganographic issues just mentioned above by generating noiseless steganographic cover e.g., text, game, graph, image, etc. Mainly, Nostega achieves the steganographical goal based on a DSS, which ease the process of generating a steganographic cover whether it is a linguistic or non-linguistic cover. The main advantages of Nostega system are as follows. First, it opts to use steganographic carriers that retain high volume of traffic by a wide variety of people to allow establishing a covert channel and avert suspicion in the presence of covert communications. Second, Nostega does not imply a particular pattern (noise) that an adversary may look for. Third, the concealment process of Nostega has no effect on the linguistics of the generated text-cover. Linguistically, Nostega-based cover is meaningful, rhetorically sound, semantically coherent, and legitimate render it capable of passing both computer and human examinations. Fourth, all contemporary Nostega-based cover can be applied to all languages. Fifth, Nostega steganographic carriers have adequate room for concealing data and Nostega system observed superior bit rate to all contemporary steganography approaches found in the literature. The implementation and steganalysis validation demonstrate that Nostega system is capable of achieving the steganographical goal. Hence, Nostega paradigm is highly prosing for future work.
Finally, due to both the advances of steganalysis field and the successful achievement of Nostega paradigm it is strongly recommended that the Nostega paradigm to be adapted for constructing any future steganography scheme.
